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Andrew Baker and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill 
Abstract 
This article is a short introduction to a special section on economic ideas and the political 
construction of the financial crash. It begins by explaining why economic ideas and the 
politics of appeals to certain ideas are so integral to the historical significance of the crash of 
2008 and the question of whether it can be considered a crash at all. The first section covers 
the literature on ideas and economic crisis. The second section highlights that the 
contribution of the special section is to engage in a stock taking exercise of the empirical and 
conceptual patterns concerning the politics of ideational change underway in the areas of: 
comparative fiscal policy; monetary policy and Euro zone debt management; capital controls; 
and financial and securities market regulation and standard setting. The final section outlines 
the structure of this special section and content of the individual articles.  
 
Economic crises are social and political events, as much as they are economic or financial 
ones. For both empirical and conceptual reasons, the fields of political science and political 
economy have come to associate periods of financial and economic distress with far reaching 
change in salient economic ideas (Hall, 1993, Blyth, 2002, Hay, 1996.) For example, 
ideational change during the 1930s laid the foundations for the emergence of the Keynesian 
welfare state and what came to be known as the Bretton Woods order of embedded liberalism 
(Blyth, 2002, Helleiner, 1996, Ruggie, 1982, Kirshner, 2014). In the 1970s more market-
based policy ideas began to dislodge Keynesian approaches to macroeconomic policy, as 
monetarism became the first iteration of neoliberalism (Hall, 1993). Ideational change and 
the appeals to and the use of economic ideas by policy makers are integral to how periods of 
crises are politically constructed and socially understood. This is the fundamental question of 
how we define and understand a period of crisis and indeed whether a period of economic 
and financial distress can be considered a crisis at all (Hay, 2011). Such a question relates to 
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the etymological origins of crisis as a critical turning point, producing a trajectory change, in 
accordance with the original ancient Greek medical meaning of the term, where a patient 
either recovers from a condition, or withers to death (Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007, 
Gamble, 2009, Hay 2011). For a crisis to be considered and classified as crisis by this reading 
therefore, far reaching ideational change which changes both the trajectory of state 
intervention in and engagement with markets and the whole mental context of governing and 
imagining the economy, would appear to be a necessity.  
       Economic ideas represent systems of thought consisting of a series of interconnected 
claims and assumptions about how economies function, how their constituent parts should 
and do relate to one another, and the most appropriate objectives and settings of government 
economic policy. Changes in these systems of thought make a major difference in terms of 
policy and distributional outcomes. Economic openness and the organization of markets 
come in many forms and their impact is far from politically or socially neutral. Economic 
ideas can thus be conceived of as intellectual blue prints for sets of actually institutionalised 
economic relationships and as such they are both a political resource and the subject of 
political contestation (Blyth, 2002).  Consequently, economic ideas should be acknowledged 
as being heavily normative, even if often only implicitly so. They carry with them 
implications for growth, wealth distribution, social inequalities, and for the broader policy 
framework that accompanies economic adjustment processes such as welfare compensation. 
Economic ideas require political underpinnings and thus often herald new coalitions of socio-
economic constituencies as well as new forms of policy legitimation (Hall, 1993, Schmidt, 
2008, 2014). Economic ideas are thus crucial in shaping and defining the architecture, 
parameters and infrastructure of politics, informing political identity and a sense of the 
politically possible and appropriate. 
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       Earlier instances of ideational change shaped the parameters of politics itself and 
reconfigured the role the state played in the economy and society more broadly (Blyth, 2002). 
Crises may therefore give rise to processes of change and periodic reconfigurations of 
capitalism, driven by changes in the ideas policy makers employ in understanding the 
economy and in illuminating and justifying appropriate courses of action. An important task 
for political science in advancing analysis of the financial and economic distress that has 
unfolded since 2008 is to examine the political and institutional use of economic ideas in 
constructing those events and in changing the range of available appropriate policy options, 
as well as the politics this entails.  
       Few doubted the need for policy reform in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, and 
major change would seem a natural expectation for the public and policy-makers alike. Yet 
far reaching reform implies the redefinition of both the goals and instruments of economic 
governance. To what extent has the crisis disturbed ‘old’ ways of addressing economic policy 
problems and goals? Are genuine new departures observable, and based on what sorts of new 
ideational configurations? For whom and for what purpose? These questions and how and 
whether the use of economic ideas has changed since the crisis, including how we explain 
these patterns, are the focus of the following special section.  
 
Economic Crisis, the Politics of Ideational Change and the Existing Literature 
Previous crisis periods reveal that established understandings and ideas are vulnerable to the 
claim that they have failed and need to be replaced with new understandings (Hall, 1993). 
This is the Bayesian reading of ideational change based on a dynamic of the need for rational 
information updating, learning and error correction (Blyth, 2013). Recently, this has been 
counter posed against a more constructivist reading in which the primary dynamic is a social 
process relating to the realignment of authority relations and social standing, in which new 
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groups and advocates enjoy growing prominence as a result of ongoing performance, 
reputation and positioning in social networks (Blyth, 2013, Baker, 2013, Chwieroth, 2010). 
The different political dynamics of ideational change are an area of enquiry for this special 
section.  
       Crisis periods often involve the breakdown of apparently established, taken for granted 
economic relationships and policy frameworks, engendering radical Knightian uncertainty as 
a series of unique phenomenon that have not been experienced or encountered before by 
existing policy makers (Blyth, 2002). In such a context, a range of political actors search for 
new ideas to help navigate this uncertainty and to explain the particular set of circumstances 
they find themselves in. This can create a window of opportunity for norm entrepreneurs as 
expert or professional purveyors of ideas to affect change (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 
Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, 2007, Chwieroth, 2010). Crucially however such a process 
is inherently political and will be determined by norm entrepreneurs’ capacity to cultivate 
political support and constituencies for their arguments and interpretations. A process of inter 
elite – mass public persuasion concerning the nature of economic problems and what that 
necessitates in terms of policy action and reform is therefore the very essence of crisis 
politics, as a series of public arguments about the meaning of events ensues (Widmaier, Blyth 
and Seabrooke, 2007). As Peter Hall recently put it, ideational and paradigm change requires 
a motivation, a means and a motor. The last of these refers to the electoral and coalitional 
politics with which different sets of ideas are associated with and appeal to (Hall, 2013).  
        One wave of post-crash literature has resulted in a broad ‘no change’ thesis, pointing to 
a pattern of ideational inertia and the absence of change since the crash. In this respect, we 
have variously heard references to: the strange non-death of neoliberalism (Crouch, 2012); 
pathology without crisis, (equating a lack of ideational change with an absence of crisis as a 
critical turning point Hay, 2011); the status quo crisis (Helleiner, 2014); zombie economic 
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ideas that refuse to die (Quiggins, 2012); and cognitive locks and the stickiness of economic 
ideas in the current conjuncture (Blyth, 2013, 2013b). While there has been no spectacular 
paradigm collapse and shift following the crash, several of the contributions in this special 
section all suggest the picture is rather more differentiated and complicated than a simple 
inertia or ‘no change’ story.  Differences, sometimes apparently subtle, are observable across 
various policy domains and institutional frameworks. These differences may appear initially 
slight but may take on momentum as the political and social shake-out of the 2008 crash 
continues. This brings into view the incremental dynamics of ideational change as opposed to 
the dynamics of dramatic and sudden paradigm shifts (Carstensen, 2011, 2015). The primary 
aim of the selection of articles that follows is to provide a better sense of the empirical picture 
concerning how economic ideas have been used in different economic policy areas and in 
different institutional settings since the crash.  
      What all the papers have in common is a concern with how institutions and institutional 
settings shape the parameters and possibilities of ideational emergence. In this regard, all of 
the contributions at least take heed of Stephen Bell’s observation that existing ideas 
scholarship has paid insufficient attention to institutional context, how institutions and ideas 
interact and crucially how institutions mediate processes of ideational change (Bell, 2011). 
New ideas are born by existing institutional contexts that shape their emergence. They also 
imply shifts in underlying preferences across the range of socio-political constituencies in the 
political economy. The papers in this special section are therefore concerned with how social 
learning has proceeded amongst policy makers within political and institutional 
constraints/opportunities since the crash and the sets of dynamic interactions between ideas, 
institutions, political coalitions and authority relations this consequently gives rise to. In this 
respect, the question of what kind of ‘learning moment’ (Kirshner, 2014,) the 2008 crash has 
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given rise to is both an empirical and a conceptual one, and the articles here explore both 
aspects of these ongoing processes. 
        The recent financial crash opened up a window of opportunity for agents of change and 
norm entrepreneurs to push new ideas, but these forces for change have had to interact with a 
pattern of ‘path dependency’ underpinned by vested interests. Where prior knowledge and 
expertise informs institutional responses and where these same institutions are populated by 
coherent insider coalitions, there is often a durable quality to pre-existing ideas. This may 
hold even when ‘insiders’ clearly and indeed publically recognize the need for change. Long-
shared ways of thinking may trump a genuine search for radically better outcomes, due to the 
latent habitual patterns of various political and institutional actors. In this sense policy 
entrepreneurs have to shake off a crisis of understanding as much as a crisis of policy.  
 
The Contribution of the Section 
The analyses in this special section are intended not only to help us to better understand how 
ideas relate to interests and vice versa in the current epoch, but also how the dynamics of 
change and continuity are interacting in the context of the persistence of chronic economic 
problems and underperformance, recently referred to as secular stagnation (Summers, 2014). 
In this regard, all of the papers tell us something about the potential political and historical 
significance of the crash and its response as a transformational moment or sequence of 
events. Ideas in this sense have a crucial place in the political construction of this crisis and 
of responses to it: they provide coalitions with resources for change or inertia, because they 
help agents to visualize how the economy works and how best to respond with policy; ideas 
provide agents with alibis to allocate blame and to discredit existing institutions or practices; 
and they provide institutional blueprints for the future, indicating potential solutions and 
remedies that can reorder social and political relations and instigate institutional 
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transformations (Blyth, 2002). However, translating ideas into practice, including those that 
challenge or refute elements of an existing orthodoxy, can be a protracted or incremental 
process that can take a decade or more to transpire and work through (Helleiner, 2010, Baker, 
2013b, 2014, Moschella this issue, Carstensen, 2011, 2015). At the same time, the risk of 
political derailment and veto-player resistance is omnipresent (Tsingou, 2015). If we are to 
make sense of the politics of the recent financial crisis and its on-going fallout, it is important 
to engage in stock-taking exercises that enhance our understanding of the range of political 
conditions required for new ideas to succeed, how those conditions in turn shape the 
evolution of ideas, as well as how economic ideas in turn shape the process of constructing 
and reforming institutional and political orders. This is the primary contribution of this 
special section and it involves understanding how path dependency and ‘cognitive locking’ 
can give a durable quality to pre-existing ideas (Pierson 2000, Hall, 1986, Underhill this 
issue), creating a barrier to pressures for change from agents pushing new ideas and seeking 
to cultivate support for those ideas amongst the wider public, resulting in a dynamic interplay 
between forces of change and inertia.  
       The special section also explores how far understanding of the politics of the crisis, its 
construction and meaning, can be furthered by treating ‘crisis politics’ as a series of 
arguments and persuasive struggles over the meaning of events (Widmaier, Blyth, Seabrooke, 
2007). In this sense it considers how elites develop strategies for communicating with 
electorates and the extent to which they draw on economic ideas for this purpose and how 
and whether are used somewhat strategically and instrumentally for this purpose (Dellepane-
Avellendea this issue, Schmidt, 2014). 
      The  section explores post-crisis ideational and policy responses and the extent of change 
in relation to five crucial policy domains:  fiscal adjustment as a policy response to crisis 
(Dellepiane-Avellaneda);  thinking on monetary policy and debt management in the Euro-
 8 
area and in particular the role of the ECB – which was undergoing its first major test in crisis 
circumstances (Braun); global rules on macroeconomic adjustment and in particular the 
management of capital flows (Moschella); and banking supervision and securities market 
regulation (Underhill). Each of these policy domains has an important element of 
international or indeed transnational governance with deeper roots in older systems of 
national economic governance. International institutions and policy processes thus interact 
with domestic level political economies and the complex patterns of interests and 
constituencies one might expect. Each of these institutions and policy domains was also 
closely associated with the institutionalization of the post-Keynesian consensus on a market-
based approach to economic governance that emerged in the 1980s and was consolidated in 
the 1990s (McNamara, 1998, Baker, 2006). Many of these institutions and policy domains 
were also the post-crisis target for virulent accusations of capture by special interests, of 
systematic ideational bias, of domination by the policy elites of their strongest economies 
(the IMF) and their core corporate interests, and of course of massive policy failure (Johnson 
and Kwak, 2011, Baker, 2010, Underhill and Zhang, 2008, Chwieroth, 2009, Claessens, 
Underhill and Zhang, 2008, Mattli and Woods, 2009). One might reasonably expect much 
post-crisis debate and soul-searching. There is little doubt that policy elites, who are after all 
responsible to democratic processes at the national level wherein domestic electorates have 
become more radicalised than before the crisis, have felt the heat of criticism and expressed 
openly the need for change and a better future for the global economy (Thirkell-White, 
2009). These same elites also managed to avoid the sort of meltdown that happened in the 
1930s, a source of potential complacency. The record of post-crisis policy and ideational 
change thus remains nuanced, and at best we can only see the outlines, or seeds, of significant 
ideational change that may or may not emerge in the future. 
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Structure of the Section  
Sebastien Dellepiane-Avellaneda begins this section with probably the best known and well 
versed area of pre-crisis ideational debate and consensus – the rise of fiscal austerity as a 
political and policy agenda (Blyth, 2013b Stanley, 2014). Dellepiane-Avellaneda explores the 
origins of the notion of ‘expansionary fiscal contractions’ tracing it to the 1990s and the work 
of Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano. The idea identified national fiscal deficits as a key 
ingredient of financial and macroeconomic instability, and thus fiscal adjustment as a key 
element of adjustment and crisis resolution. This policy mechanism advocating severe and 
rapid fiscal adjustment as a key ingredient of re-establishing growth in a crisis ran strongly 
counter to the ‘old-now-new’ Keynesian idea of pursuing fiscal stimulus in bad times, above 
all in a severe crisis wherein national governments should co-ordinate support for growth 
across borders. Initially, the G20 process – led by the US – appeared to herald the ‘return 
triumph’ of the fiscal stimulus and co-ordination position and its ‘new’ ideational 
underpinnings. As time went on and the recession worsened, a period in which we would 
expect the consolidation of new ideas, fiscal austerity became more the norm, above all in the 
Euro-area but also in the UK, in the US Congress, and across a range of other countries hit by 
the crisis and subsequent recession. This controversial ideational framework has proven more 
robust than the depth and length of crisis might lead one to expect. Dellepiane-Avellaneda 
explores the idea of expansionary contractions on actual policy choices by examining the 
politics of austerity in Ireland, Spain and the UK. He finds evidence that outside of a small 
group of hard liners, few key policy actors actually believed that fiscal contraction would be 
expansionary and beneficial, and rather took the view that this time it would hurt. The 
important contribution here, is the demonstration of how the ascendancy of fiscal contraction 
as a primary policy priority has depended upon a process of ideational screening and 
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intellectual repression, suggesting social construction has been a more prevalent policy 
dynamic than Bayesian learning in the politics of fiscal policy.  
      Benjamin Braun focuses on the governance of the Euro-area and in particular the role of 
the European Central Bank (ECB). Braun’s contribution is to emphasise crisis preparedness 
and crisis management are very distinct phases that create path dependencies that subsequent 
efforts at institution building find difficult to escape from. Braun argues that the lack of 
preparedness for crisis in the existing policy paradigm (both systemic banking crisis and 
sovereign debt crisis), inadvertently resulted in ECB empowerment. Emergency responses 
Braun argues set precedents that have left their imprint on the institutional and ideational 
landscape in the Euro zone, which purposeful institutional entrepreneurs will find difficult to 
escape from. Consequently, the existing crisis as critical juncture literature, has, over 
emphasised the capacity for strategic and voluntaristic policy learning and institutional re-
design. This point is important: if the standard rulebook proves inapplicable or irrelevant to 
the real-time events of crisis, rapid innovation can result. The lack of a bank resolution 
mechanism meant the ECB had to act as lender of last resort fashioning a new role for itself, 
thereby demonstrating a capacity for policy and institutional innovation. Braun shows how 
this challenged existing ideas about monetary governance in the euro zone that the ECB as an 
independent central bank should focus solely on inflation targeting. The lack of existing 
institutional mechanisms to deal with financial distress, meant that the no bail out and no 
monetisation of debt clauses as main stays of euro zone design effectively had to be 
abandoned. In this context the ECB, has begun to recognise that in future monetary policy 
will have to play a role in financial stability by curbing asset price rises, moving the ECB 
away from the pre-crash Jackson Hole central banking consensus. The dynamic at work here 
appears to closer to Bayesian learning and updating. The ideational change that has resulted 
from a more dominant ECB, Braun concludes, is closer to a form of paradigm maintenance 
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and adjustment than paradigm change, not least because the ECB’s enhanced powerful 
central post-crash institutional  position enables it to defend the existing paradigm if it so 
chooses. This has been evident in a more orthodox approach to the management of the Euro-
area debt crisis, with small movements towards limited quantitative easing only emerging in 
2015. The Bank has effectively used its new position to reinforce ‘old ideas’ on fiscal 
consolidation, so central to the analysis of Dellepiane-Avellaneda. Some change has therefore 
materialised, but it has been of much less importance for the citizen-taxpayers whose 
resources guaranteed the banks in the first place.  
     Manuella Moschella then presents a clear case of policy and ideational change, and one 
that was long run in terms of incubation. Her article focuses on the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and its policy approach to capital flows in the post-crisis period. The roots of this 
important ideational shift lie in the pre-crisis years when episodes of financial instability 
affected emerging market economies. When the great financial crisis hit the core financial 
centres, the ongoing institutional debate shifted definitively in favour of a new policy 
consensus and new advice to members. The ideational underpinnings of this change are 
scepticism about the capacity of global capital markets to consistently yield acceptable or 
indeed workable outcomes for a wide range of IMF members and their societies. A new 
consensus was also required to legitimate and stabilise a highly-integrated global economy 
including more prominent rising emerging market economies, that did so much to rescue the 
international system. In this case, institutional dynamics were very much part of a new 
ideational consensus that evolved incrementally and took several shocks to solidify. In the 
case of the Fund and capital controls, Moschella finds that institutional frictions acted as 
enabling factors, rather than closing down reform, as existing IMF institutional mandates 
enabled staff the space to gradually and creatively reinterpret the desirable approach to 
controls. Again a Bayesian dynamic appears evident in this policy area to date. 
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       Finally, Geoffrey Underhill examines post-crisis policy change in international banking 
and securities market supervision and regulation. He focuses on the post-crisis debate and 
reform measures promulgated by two prominent international organisations responsible for 
developing and enforcing international standards for financial stability and the regulation of 
cross-border financial markets and institutions. The norms of global financial supervision 
were in the front line of the attack mounted by pre-crisis critics and post-crisis reformers 
alike. As the crisis emerged and the evidence piled up, volume after volume detailed the 
extent of policy capture, the dominance of the financial sector over regulators, the weakness 
of implementation and enforcement, and thus the dramatic failure of the policy framework 
and its ideational underpinnings of ‘market-based governance’ to prevent crisis and deliver 
financial stability. Citizens and their elected representatives reeled and fumed at the cost of 
bank rescues, of hedge fund failures, and at Ponzi fraud like that of the Madoff investment 
empire. While few bankers hung their heads in shame, official sector supervisors and 
regulators promised better - a lot better. Yet Underhill argues that fundamental change, 
despite seeming apposite conditions, has not materialised, at least not yet. The ideational 
underpinnings of market-based financial governance remain largely intact and interest-based 
and institutional reflexes die hard. This may change. The ideational ingredients of a major 
shift are in place, and some national central banks such as the Bank of England appear 
resolute in developing a new policy agenda. Yet so far, path-dependency and vested interests 
are holding out, delaying and diluting change where earlier they had to concede in the post-
crisis deluge.  
      The political and policy fall out from the crash of 2008 is still unfolding, so definitive 
conclusions remain premature, but these four articles cast some crucial new light on the 
ideas-interests-institutions debate in relation to policy change, as well as the contemporary 
patterns of change in different policy areas. Path-dependency and its forms in different 
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institutional contexts are a repeated theme, but also how different policy areas have different 
political dynamics. Fiscal policy has emerged as the most politicised of these policy areas, 
where authority relations appear most important. The pace of change has moved slowly in all 
of our policy areas, due to a combination of political and institutional factors, but crisis 
generated ideational and political tensions have been evident in all policy areas, and have not 
as yet been fully and finally resolved. The situation of post-crash change both generally and 
in the policy areas covered here remains dynamic and politically fluid. That makes the 
articles included here both interesting and important for political scientists.  
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1
 All of the papers in this special section were originally presented in an ECPR joint sessions workshop directed 
by Andrew Baker and Geoffrey Underhill hosted in Antwerp, 10
th
-15
th
 April 2012, entitled “Economic Ideas 
and the Political Construction of Financial Crisis and Reform.” The four papers were selected by the workshop 
directors to form this special section from the contributions and have since been subjected to a double blind peer 
review process.  
